An investigation of the drone attack on a US military base in Jordan called "Tower 22" that left three Army Reserve soldiers dead in January 2024 reveals an atmosphere of complacency, lack of situational awareness, and incompetence that is inexplicable in a combat zone but sadly a day ending in "y" for the military of Lloyd Austin and CQ Brown.

At 5:53 a.m. on January 28, 2024, a drone launched by an Iranian-backed militia slammed into the sleeping area where most of Tower 22's 350-man garrison was bunked. The dead were Sergeant William Jerome Rivers of Carrollton, Georgia; Specialist Kennedy Ladon Sanders of Waycross, Georgia; and Specialist Breonna Alexsondria Moffett of Savannah, Georgia. All were assigned to the 718th Engineer Company, 926th Engineer Battalion, 926th Engineer Brigade, Fort Benning, Georgia.

The office conducting the investigation is not identified in media reports, though it seems to have been under the auspices of US Army Central (USARCENT), the Army component of US Central Command. The investigating agency could tell us a lot about the thinking of the USARCENT command group at the time. Generally speaking, if it is an Inspector General investigation, the focus is on tightening up processes and procedures. If the investigator was appointed under Army Regulation 15-6, someone's career was hanging by a thread, and a court martial is possible. If the investigation was by the Army's Criminal Investigation Division, then an assumption was made that criminal conduct was likely. My guess is that this is a 15-6 investigation.

Defense was neglected.

After the October 7 attack on Israel, defensive equipment was rushed to US installations in Iraq and Jordan. Tower 22 was "assumed" to be at a lower risk than other bases and got nothing.

No drone defenses available.

CENTCOM had requested anti-drone defense systems based on its risk analysis, but the entire US Army only had one, count them, one, system available, and it was reserved for redeployment training. Why you'd bother to use training time to gain familiarity with a system you will never see again is an unanswered question. Needless to say, nothing is too good for the troops, and that is exactly what they get. The base had one electronic warfare system designed to counter drones, but it was not used.

Drone activity was known.

In October, a militia drone crashed near the base, and reconnaissance drones were seen on several occasions. Some 90 minutes before the attack, intelligence warned Tower 22 that militias were openly discussing their "intent to target U.S. forces in the area." This prompted a “stay vigilant" order (really, vigilant?) from the base's second-in-command to the team on radar watch. Ominiously, "a laser was pointed at Tower 22 from Rukban, a camp less than two miles away housing thousands of displaced Syrians."

Radar not optimized for drones.

Tower 22's radar was not optimized for the most likely threat. Frequently, operators could not distinguish birds from drones. A better radar system had been requested and denied.

Indecision and negligence.

The inbound drone was detected, but there was a “failure to interrogate or assess the unidentified aircraft.” Making things worse, a friendly drone was landing at the base as the enemy drone was inbound. "A minute later, the screen pinged, showing an unknown object approaching Tower 22 from the south, but the watch team — and a powerful surveillance camera — was focused on the friendly drone as it came in to land, the report says." My guess would be that the landing time of the friendly drone was routine, and the attack was timed to coincide with that activity. No one noticed the drone until it was heard shortly before impact: "At 5:35 a.m., the investigation says, a low whirring sound, like a lawn mower, could be heard — and then a fiery blast."

Manning decisions.

Even though the overnight watch was considered to have the highest risk of attack, none of the officers on the base were on duty. The operations center was left to the supervision of a noncommissioned officer. Nothing is wrong with that per se, but I can't imagine a combat situation where a commissioned officer is not on duty in the operations center. The people running the operations center “did not feel fully empowered to make important decisions even when faced with imminent danger to the base.”

The night shift was on for 12 hours, and based on my experience running a tactical operations center, I would guess they were about to go off duty. To be clear, 12-hour watches aren't unusual, and there are ways of scheduling to ensure you constantly have fresh staff coming on duty. I staggered start times for my operations cell every four hours, but that is just a technique. One of the fixes has been to change to an 8-hour shift and increase the number of leaders on each shift.

Lack of seriousness.

According to the report, the base did not practice drone attack drills; "Leaders at Tower 22 also failed to implement proper training, and the base’s battle drills were 'inadequate,' investigators determined." It would be interesting to know if they had a drill to defend the base from a ground attack.

According to the report, four officers faced disciplinary action over the incident. There is no information on what that entailed.

A fish rots from the head down. From what we know of the report, everyone seemed to think that the danger facing the troops at Tower 22 was manageable. Tower 22 did not have defensive anti-aircraft systems, though a suitable anti-aircraft system was available. The laissez-faire attitude toward security obviously perked down to the command and operations staff at Tower 22. They seem to have assumed away the possibility of an attack because none had taken place previously.

Given the leadership in the White House and the Pentagon, none of this should be a shock. It was virtually preordained that the same brainiacs who gave us Abbey Gate would go for an encore. One hopes that Pete Hegseth's team has not forgotten about either of these fiascos and is hunting out the perpetrators in Washington and at every level down to the people running Tower 22.

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