Here we are, 905 days into Putin's grand adventure in Ukraine. Just for laughs, let's go back and see how the talking heads on Russian television predicted a war would go.
The big story remains Ukraine's incursion into Russia's Kursk Oblast. While the overall goal of this invasion remains rather cloudy to me, it is clearly having some effects on the Kremlin.
The most important outcome may not be a good one for Ukraine. Allegedly, this is a level of military incompetence that Russian President Vladimir Putin can't ignore. When you consider that no Russian military commander has been cashiered for the blazingly incompetent planning of the invasion or the conduct of the war, the fact that heads may roll in this case is astounding.
Why do I say this may not be good for Ukraine? If Putin fires enough people, it is theoretically possible that he will eventually find competent leadership somewhere in the Russian Army and promote it.
The invasion of Kursk has forced Putin to do something besides dismissing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It has raised the profile of the invasion and will require a Russian reaction. I recommend this tweet thread for some background. But the bottom line is that the invasion is an issue in Russia, and if Russia loses to an "inferior" people, what does this say about Russia?
There is no less confusion in Washington (or London or Berlin).
On the one hand, there has been no public statement indicating a demand by Washington for a Ukrainian withdrawal. Quite the contrary:
On the other hand, there is a fetishistic attachment to preventing the use of US weapons for deep strikes in Russia. The fetish is so strong it is nearly sexual in nature and makes otherwise arguably sane people say patently insane stuff.
Striking airbases inside Russia keeps Ukrainian cities much safer than shooting down the missiles they launch. Attacking supply depots inside Russia prevents those supplies from ever getting to the front, thereby increasing the chances of successful Ukrainian efforts to liberate occupied territory.
Another story implies that Washington still doesn't know what Ukraine is up to, or, in the words of the immortal poet, they are acting "Like their heads were on fire and their asses was catching."
🇺🇸🇺🇦 Yesterday, the DoD said they were still trying to understand Ukraine's intentions with the Kursk operation even after @SecDef spoke to @rustem_umerov.
— Colby Badhwar 🇨🇦🇬🇧 (@ColbyBadhwar) August 16, 2024
Weird statement. 🤨
Now we learn that they are concerned that Ukraine has been too successful & is pushing too deep. 🤡 pic.twitter.com/IsFmz4nS6T
Unfortunately, the actions of Biden's national security team make statements like this have the ring of truth in the same way the story of Biden betraying Mossad agents in Tehran sounds likely: see OPINION: Biden May Not Have Betrayed Mossad Agents to Iran, but the Proof It Didn't Happen Is Lacking.
Indeed, the way the West responds in Ukraine will ultimately determine whether Europe and the world return to the "might makes right" system, in which small nations are party favors for larger ones.
Here are some of my past updates.
Putin's War, Week 128. Russia Invaded – RedState
Putin's War, Week 127. F-16s Arrive
Putin's War, Week 125. North Korea Sending Food to Russia Was Not on My Bingo Card
Putin's War, Week 124. NATO Summit Meets and Putin Levels a Hospital
Putin's War, Week 122. Zelensky Scores, Putin Flops, and Crimea Under Fire
For all my Ukraine War coverage, click here.
Politico-Strategic Level
New US Aid Package
Politico reports that Senators Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal are collaborating on a new Ukraine aid package. I'm sorry, but I don't see it happening before the Biden grifters are cleaned out.
🇺🇸🇺🇦 I remain deeply skeptical that an additional supplemental will pass this year. If it's going to have any chance, Biden needs to drop all remaining restrictions on Ukraine and drastically increase the size of Drawdowns that they are receiving. https://t.co/6AYzPGuPoZ
— Colby Badhwar 🇨🇦🇬🇧 (@ColbyBadhwar) August 15, 2024
Attacks On Ukrainian Population Centers Continue
Trouble in Paradise
There is a train of argumentation on social media that says China and Russia are allies and work in tandem toward joint goals. This article provides one of the better descriptions of the theory, despite being nearly a decade old, and gives us an idea about the validity of that point of view. While I can see the attraction of the concept to a certain class of international relations majors, I don't think it holds up. China doesn't want to be an ally of Russia because of the vast power differential between them and they know what happened to Imperial Germany when it allied itself with Austria-Hungary. China knows that Putin could drag them into a war. Russia is a client state of China. It sells oil and gas to China at cut-rate prices, and it sells crap products to Russia because no one else will touch them.
Read the whole thread; it is excellent.
Lukashenko Strives for Relevance
Belarus's Grand Poohbah Aleksandr Lukashenko is desperately trying to give the impression of doing something to help Russia while doing nothing to convince the Poles that he's worth the effort of thumping. One of the reasons Ukraine was able to invade Kursk Oblast is that Lukashenko moved his forces off the border, signaling that he would not invade Ukraine. This freed up Ukrainian units that had been frozen in place to defend against a possible Belarusian attack.
Contracts On Pro-Ukrainian Social Media Accounts?
There is no doubt that pro-Ukriane social media accounts have done a lot to solidify public support for Ukraine, push back on Russian propaganda, and raise money for Ukrainian military units. Allegedly, the FSB has taken notice and asked for permission to take them out.
Conceptually, I don't find this surprising at all. The Kremlin goes after its enemies in a very serious manner. Given the increasing profile of the FSB in this war — an FSB general now runs the operation in Kursk — I don't dismiss this out of hand.
It Was NATO
One of the ongoing Russian narratives about Putin's War is that every setback suffered by Russian arms is at the hands of NATO, particularly Brits or Poles. The reason is pretty simple. Russian is willing to admit being beaten by Western powers, but if it admits Ukraine can kick its ass, then the glue holding together the increasingly fragile Russian Federation becomes much weaker. This is the latest version of that narrative.
Irony Is Dead and Composting in the Cabbage Patch
I'm Sorry, Sir, This is Wendy's
Listen to Them When They Tell You What They are Doing
As I've said many times, it is easy to ignore these people because they sound like guys who didn't make the cut to be Bond Villains. We need to keep in mind that these are perceived as serious people in Russia; they are speaking on Russian state television, they are mouthing words that the regime has approved, and their purpose is to tell the Russians what to believe. When they tell us that Russia's boundaries are the ocean, we should probably give them the respect of acknowledging that what they are saying does not sound strange in Russia and that it has the approval of the Kremlin.
Operational Level
The situation for this 129th week remains largely stable. Russia has eeked out small gains in Donbas, but they seem more like an effort to reach the administrative boundaries of Donetsk and Luhansk, allowing those oblasts to be declared 100% under Russian control than they seem focused on creating a tactical or operational breakthrough.
What is notable is that the number of reported air strikes has declined since the invasion. This, I think, indicates that the Russian Air Force is finally feeling the spare parts pinch. We are overdue for a serious Russian missile attack, and every day that passes is an indication that the resources for the large 100-missile attacks we've seen in the past don't exist. The number of reported Russian ground and MLRS has also declined. To me, this indicates troops and equipment being moved to Kursk.
There is something of an online pee-pee measuring contest going on on the subject of Russian troops being diverted from Occupied Ukraine to Kursk. CNN reported this is happening; see Russia appears to have diverted several thousand troops from occupied Ukraine to counter Kursk offensive, US officials say | CNN Politics.)
The Financial Times's guy says it isn't happening.
So a couple important things about this:
— Christopher Miller (@ChristopherJM) August 14, 2024
1) What we’ve seen is Russia only moving very few troops from Ukraine;
2) Units from Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv and Crimea are not going to give Ukraine the relief it needs from the hottest sectors of the frontline, which are in Donetsk region https://t.co/LxwYSu5Oys
Bertrand is nothing if not a faithful transcriptionist for the US Intelligence Community, perhaps only exceeded by Ken Delanian. I have to believe that is what she was told, and I think her credibility is too valuable to the IC for them to burn her. The Financial Times hasn't been terribly accurate when reporting on the war. Finally, I posted a video last week of Russian troops leaving Donbas for Kursk. Now we have even more video.
Redeployment of RuAF from Zaporizhzhia axis presumably to Kursk region. 858km M-4 highway, a column of Group of troops 'East' heading northward: 14xMT-LB, 1xBTR-82, 4x2S1 Gvozdika, 2x BM-21 Grad.
— D'Mithridates (@Rhaescuporis) August 16, 2024
48.93203422805031, 40.46392796857284@GeoConfirmed pic.twitter.com/IAFqF5UYsN
This kind of public appeal also increases the chances of Russia sending more troops to Kursk.
The governor of Kursk oblast made a video asking Putin to take troops from occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts to defend Kursk. pic.twitter.com/8y8hG10LYz
— BroSINT 69™ (@osint_69) August 15, 2024
I think the video evidence and the numbers of infantry and rocket attacks all indicate that Russian troops are being moved from Occupied Ukraine to Kursk.
Of course, the big puzzle is what is going on in Kursk. As I see it, there are three possible objectives. Two of those are strategic, and one is operational.
The logical operational objective is to cut through Russian territory and threaten the Russian forces operating in northern Kharkiv with envelopment from the rear. As you know from the map in the "Russian Front" sector, the Ukrainians have dropped one or two bridges — the reporting is muddled — over the Seym River. While this may result in the encircling of all Russian forces south of the river, a strong case can be made that this move, along with artillery and drones, secures the Ukrainian left flank from any Russian attack. This would free up forces to press the attack on the Ukrainian right flank and threaten the troops in Kharkiv.
That's the best I can come up with for a concept that supports an operational objective. The least likely objective is to grab a chunk of Russia and hold it as a bargaining chip. The logic goes like this. Kursk's population has a small number of ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian language speakers. Ukraine could grab that area and hold it under the guise of protecting Ukrainians and use it as a bargaining chip to trade for Russian evacuation of parts of Occupied Ukraine. I don't see how this works. Claiming to protect Ukrainians and then bargaining them away is not a great political move. Plus, it draws resources away from the main battle.
Ukriane's most likely course of action is — again, this is my opinion — to operate in the area until serious numbers of Russian troops appear, then conduct a very publicly announced orderly, fighting retreat that kills as many Russians as possible and destroys all the public infrastructure in the occupied area of Kursk.
It is critical for Ukraine that this operation be viewed as a success, and that can only happen once Ukraine tells us what it is doing.
Refugee Hotline
This hotline is working in tandem with Ukrainian forces to distribute food and humanitarian supplies to civilians in liberated Kursk.
Railroad Collapse
I posted last week about the difficulties facing Russian railroads and the director of Russia's railway system threatening to put failed bureaucrats up against the wall. The problem may be worse than I'd thought.
Not a Learning Army
I usually show Russian talk show videos to mock the participants. This time is different. This is the Russia 1 show, "Vesti.doc," hosted by Putin's favorite, Olga Skabeyeva. The specific subject is the Russian convoy en route to Kursk that was hit by a HIMARS strike while at a half and as many as 1,000 casualties may have resulted. I have no idea who her guest is, but he makes many of the points that I've made for 30 months. The long and the short of it is that Russia has not been at war with Ukraine for 30 months. It has been at war with Ukraine for one month 30 times.
He says commanders and troops still use messaging apps that are routinely intercepted by Ukrainian forces. Convoys don't observe basic discipline. He blames the West and floats the idea of shooting down US reconnaissance drones operating over the Black Sea (see Putin's War, Week 55. Russia Drops US Recon Drone, Ukraine Suffers From 'Loose Lips' as It Doubles Down on Bakhmut – RedState), but he hits the nail on the head. "Again," he says, "all the enemy's successes are not because the enemy is super-smart, but because we make the same mistakes over and over again."
So when you read stories like Russia’s army is learning on the battlefield (economist.com), you are reading a substantial amount of bullsh**. The Russian Army does not have a noncommissioned officer corps to collect and pass on techniques. It doesn't rotate experienced men out of the field to train conscripts; it leaves them in place until they die. To the extent the Russian Army has learned, it is at echelons that don't suffer from combat attrition.
Help Wanted
I Had a Great Burrito Today
A few months ago, I reported on an American defector going missing in the Donetsk People's Republic; see Putin's War, Week 112. Ukraine Funding Passes and ATACMS Hit Crimea – RedState. Russell Bentley was a Putinista in the mold of several social media personalities like David Sacks and some commenters here at RedState. He moved to Donbas and fought for Russia during the 2014 war. The full story is in this thread:
2/ On 8 April 2024, Bentley was kidnapped by DPR soldiers outside the administration building of the Petrovsky district of Donetsk. He was driven away in an unknown direction. On 19 April, his former unit, the Vostok Battalion, confirmed his death. His body has not been found.
— ChrisO_wiki (@ChrisO_wiki) August 16, 2024
New Weapons
Robot Dogs
Combat Operations
Platoon Attack
This attack occurred at Spirne, north of Bakhmut, near the administrative border between Donetsk and Luhansk. It involves a platoon of Russian mechanized infantry. The Russians attack in two waves.
If you aren't interested in the whole video, this thread has clips and descriptions.
Clearance Operations in Kursk
I'm trying to parse out Kursk-related items to hold for my next "Russia Invaded" update, but I decided to make an exception for this one. For what it's worth, I have yet to encounter anyone from an Allied Special Operations Forces community who thinks the Spetsnaz, particularly the FSB variety, is much more than a joke.
More Attacks on Ukrainian Positions
This video is from the Russian side and shows a BM-21 rocket launcher unit conducting preparatory fires for the Russians in the above video.
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Machinegun Training in the Second Most Powerful Army in Ukraine
Whatever Works
Discipline is Not Bondage
This is video of Russian troops undergoing field punishment for some infraction.
“The beatings will continue until morale improves.”
— Jason Jay Smart (@officejjsmart) August 17, 2024
It is hard to imagine why so many Russian soldiers are surrendering to Ukraine 🇺🇦, without a fight, instead of fighting for their country.
pic.twitter.com/7DRzcSU5bK
It is a matter of time until the Russian Army discovers the time-honored technique of "fragging."
Russian Front
Kursk
I plan to start weekly updates on the Kursk offensive because a) there is a lot of information to cover, and b) these updates are already challenging the attention span of some of my readers. My first Kursk update is at Russia Invaded, Week 1. The State of Play. I am going to drop a couple of items in here just to keep you up to date.
Early reports suggested that parts of the Ukrainian Army crossed the frontier disguised as Russian troops. Given the great degree of commonality in equipment and language and the Russian troops being largely untrained conscripts, this seemed plausible. Apparently, it was not only plausible but so effective that it is continuing with Ukrainian troops playing the role of Russian reinforcements.
The major tactical change is in the northwest area, where the main bridge over the Seym River has been dropped. The Russian Army in that area is dependent on two low-capacity bridges and a ribbon bridge near the site of the dropped bridge. This will create an interesting operational problem for the Russian commander in the area over the next week.
Air Mobile Operation
This is the Ukrainian Army conducting a platoon-sized airmobile operation. Given the circumstances, it appears to be more of an aerial movement to link up with friendly forces, but it is telling that this is possible.
Ukrainian forces conducted an air assault behind enemy lines around Lgov, Kursk!
— osinterer (@osinterer) August 14, 2024
Ruzzians are still suppressing this information.
Video, as promised.@secretsqrl123 @WarMonitor3@JayinKyiv pic.twitter.com/RoQrfSUXNO
According to Russian Telegram posts, the operation was more extensive than we see here.
Sooo it looks like we were wrong lmao
— Likes-To-Fight-Guy (@BellicoseCitizn) August 16, 2024
They actually did it pic.twitter.com/mqwxVPO329
Northern Front
Kharkiv
Hlyboke-Vovchansk
There is no change to the front line.
⚡️🪖Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kharkiv near #Lyptsi and northeast of #Kharkiv City near Starytsya and #Vovchansk on August 15 and 16 but according to @TheStudyofWar did not make confirmed advances.#Russia's objective is to push Ukrainian forces back… pic.twitter.com/Vu3rC7I8o6
— Denys from Kharkiv (@GlushkoDenys) August 17, 2024
Kreminna-Kupyansk-Svatove
There were minor Russian gains, but the front line remains stable and unchanged.
ISW - Geolocated footage - Russian forces marginally advanced within northeastern Makiivka (northwest of #Kreminna). #War_in_Ukraine pic.twitter.com/OvNsys6pky
— #War_in_Ukraine #Facts #Opinions #Trends #Kharkiv (@HarZizn) August 18, 2024
Donbas
The most troubling area on the Donbas front remains the northern rim of the old Avdiivka Salient. That area lost cohesiveness during a relief-in-place operation and has never recovered. That weakness has drawn nonstop Russian attacks.
Donetsk Oblast: Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
— Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar) August 17, 2024
1/ Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Chasiv Yar. Geolocated footage published on August 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced across the Siverskyi Donets Donbas… https://t.co/8H0z01dCCs pic.twitter.com/UNJ87sWuTh
The area is of particular concern because, unlike the area west of Bakhmut, a penetration here could give the Ukrainian command some anxious moments. So far, the Russians have been satisfied with chipping away at the front line and haven't tried to put together a major operation.
Southern Front
Zaporizhzhia
No reported activity in this area. The front line remains stable.
Kherson
No reported activity in this area. The front line remains stable.
Rear Areas
Crimea
Oil Platform
Russia
Massive Airbase Attack
Chkalovsky Air Base is no random airfield, but hosts the 8th Special Purpose Aviation Division, which operates Russia's four Il-80 'doomsday planes'. It is also commonly used for long-range VIP flights with for instance Il-96s. pic.twitter.com/TDzb2mEs97
— Pax Lusitanica (@PaxLusitanica) August 11, 2024
Oil Depot, Proletarsk, Rostov Oblast
Russian oil depot in Proletarsk, Rostov, attacked by drones. pic.twitter.com/xEauvhmgD2
— 𝔗𝔥𝔢 𝕯𝔢𝔞𝔡 𝕯𝔦𝔰𝔱𝔯𝔦𝔠𝔱△ 🇬🇪🇺🇦🇺🇲🇬🇷 (@TheDeadDistrict) August 18, 2024
Air Defense Operations
It is hard to determine whether this is accurate, but here it is.
Chkalovksy Airbase, Moscow Oblast
There have been no reports on the outcome of this attack.
What's Next
In my view, three things have to happen in the next four weeks. First, Ukraine has to bring the Kursk operation to a climax and wind it down. I don't see how an occupation of a big slice of Kursk is ever anything but a sideshow, and we're not seeing the combat power developing there to threaten the Russian forces operating in Kharkiv. The longer that operation goes on, the greater the risk of it going pear-shaped. The second thing that has to happen is Ukraine has to stop the Russian offensive in Donetsk. While not a threat, and even though it may be killing a lot of Russians, it gives the impression that Russia still has the initiative and is driving the train. The third thing that has to come together is a credible Ukrainian attack that regains Ukrainian territory. While militarily, this may not be a huge priority, it is politically, particularly if Donald Trump wins in November. I'm not alone in holding that thought.
Russian propagandists discuss "an even larger-scale Ukrainian offensive in late August/early September."
— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) August 13, 2024
"Probably the blocking of the land corridor to Crimea along with a massive F-16 strike on the Crimean bridge," they discussed on air on Channel One. pic.twitter.com/ngW1BNYd5J
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